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Pentagon Plan for an "Imaginary Cuban Leader"

This May 13, 1963 proposal for creating an "imaginary Cuban leader" to
"serve as a focal point" for the anti-Castro movement was authored by Lt.
Col. James Patchell, a veteran of Operation Mongoose who worked out of
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This particular propaganda plan was
never put into action, but similar ones were. Patchell's proposal was
declassified in 1998.

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SUBJECT: Future Cuban Leadership

INTRODUCTION

Following is a proposal for the creation of an imaginary Cuban leader. This
proposal is presented primarily to fill gaps existing in the present policy study.
It will become obvious that this proposal can be utilized in conjunction with
current programs as well as many of those programs proposed for the future.
It may be necessary to address this proposal or a similar proposal separately
and in advance of the policy study; however, in the event no pressing
requirement exists, it is suggested that this proposal be considered in
conjunction with the policy study and handled on a closely held basis.

REASON FOR PROPOSAL

Following are listed a number of indications that the leadership question
will be addressed in the near future:

a. With the termination of U.S. support to the Cuban Revolutionary
Council (CRC) a vacuum has been created. Various exile groups in the U.S.
and elsewhere will be vying for recognition and support in an attempt to fill this
void.

b. There has been constant pressure on the U.S. and on other Latin
American countries to recognize a government in exile. This proposal could
serve to lessen or eliminate much of this political and psychological pressure.

c. This proposal could serve to reduce the bickering among exile
groups and may serve to resolve some of the problems of Cuban exile
unification.

d. The proposal could emphasize the development of a native "David"
in opposition to Castro, the Cuban "Goliath." This could serve the U.S. image
by making Castro the "Goliath" rather than the "David" who opposes the
"North American Giant."

e. This proposal could serve to prevent the U.S. from making
premature commitments to a leader or a particular exile group and could be
used as a device to test exile response.

f. This proposal could retain for the U.S. the ability to control future
selections of leaders or groups (timing and political ideologies).

g. This proposal could permit the U.S. on a progressive basis to
influence the ideologies of the resistance and thus to influence the platform of a
future Cuban Government.

h. The publicity associated with the prolonged existence of a resistance
in Cuba can serve to delay the furtherance of the de facto recognition of the
present Cuban Regime.

OBJECTIVE

To create an imaginary leader or image of resistance in Cuba. This image
would serve as a focal point for resistance directed against Castro by Cubans
or Latin Americans.

DEVELOPMENT

An imaginary name of a resistance leader could be developed utilizing a
popular name from Cuban history, a name associated with resistance in Cuba
or a newly devised name. The name selected should typify a person who is
friendly to the Cuban people, is anti-communist, is willing to fight against the
Regime, and is little -- but tough. There is no requirement for a detailed staff
study in order

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to determine this name. "The Little Bull," "The Little Worm," "The Friendly
Worm," "The Fighting Friend," "The Tough Peasant," or any such name which
is acceptable and meaningful in Spanish could suffice. Over a period of
several months the name could be "dropped" or leaked through U.S.
officialdom, in diplomatic channels, in intelligence channels or within the Cuban
exile community. Specific acts against the Regime could be credited to this
individual or members of his group. Communications could be arranged
between this individual and his subordinates to be picked up either by
Castro's censors or by radio intercept in Cuba or in the U.S.

After a period of time, all unexplained incidents and actions for which
credit has not been seized by some other exile group would automatically be
ascribed to our imaginary friend. At some point in time it could be leaked that
the U.S. is, in fact, supporting this imaginary person. Similarly, other Latin
American countries may, without inducement, publicly follow the U.S. pattern.

During the course of this operation it is quite possible that the Castro
Regime could indicate that the activities of this individual were terminated, that
the individual was captured, that he was being pursued, or that he was an
imaginary faker or fraud. Such action would only serve to further publicize the
actions of the individual and so long as resistance in general continued the
fame of our "Cuban Kilroy" would spread. Humorous antics could be credited
to our imaginary friend and rumors of his exploits of bravery (ala Zoro) could
be circulated.

At some point in time it may be wise to indicate what this individual stands
for. (It will become obvious that he is opposed to the Regime in Cuba.) It
could be possible to indicate little-by-little his political platform in very general
terms -- realizing that the mistique and the "generalness" connected with his
operation is, in fact, the power behind the operation. Ultimately, Cubans and
others may demand that he proclaim his complete political views or even that
he present himself physically. Since this is not desirable,

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arrangements could be made to have selected individuals meet with his
appointed representative. His instructions and words could be relayed to the
public by many means.

As his political platform becomes more apparent within the exile groups, it
may be possible to determine those willing to follow his leadership (to gain
Cuban independence under his terms) or those who are unwilling to accept his
leadership. The lines of controversy among exiles can be drawn more clearly.
Undesirable leaders and exile groups can be eliminated from the competition
through his disavowals.

Eventually, a member of the resistance in Cuba may gain sufficient stature
to assume or to be given the title of this imaginary leader. This, of course, will
depend in large measure on individual leadership ability and the ability to "fill
the boots" of this anti-Castro image.

While this scheme is replete with gimmickery, its implementation could be
undertaken in a relatively short period of time. Sensitivity of this scheme is
such that the knowledge should be held on the tightest basis and if
implemented, those proposing should not be informed. In the event the
scheme is compromised, (unless knowledge is widespread) there is little need
for plausible deniability; however, once used and compromised the scheme
can hardly be reinstated. A major advantage is that this image can be created
over a long period of time or developed rapidly without a political or
economic commitment on the part of the U.S. There may be a point at which
the U.S. could no longer disavow collaboration with this imaginary person.
This point, however, is so distant that during any point in the intervening
period it would be possible for the U.S. to disengage easily without suffering
embarrassment or loss of prestige.

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CONCLUSION

Based on a consideration of factors indicated above, it appears that the
U.S. should immediately undertake to implement this proposal, determining at
30 to 60 day future intervals what additional action should be taken to
improve, reduce, or change the image during the subsequent 30 or 60 day
period.

James K. Patchell
Lt. Colonel, USA

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Page Updated Mon Sep 20, 1999 7:00pm EDT