Illegal Aliens, Violence And American Medicine Proportional Representative - Google Search
 Born To Run? Attention Presidential Candidates
Now in 1993 voters in New Zealand approved a referendum changing
its electoral system from a plurality or "first past the post" (FPP) to
proportinal representation (PR). The adoption or PR represents a
radical change from majoritarian to a consensus democracy. There
are no current empirical studies on how "change in the electoral
system" has altered the relationship between elites and voters.
American Political Science Review
Volume 91, No. 1, March 1997
Arend Lijphart. 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma" (Presidential Address, APSA,
1996). American Political Science Review 91(March): 1-14.
Low voter turnout is a serious democratic problem for five reasons: (1) It means unequal turnout that is systematically biased
against less well-to-do-citizens. (2) Unequal turnout spells unequal political influence. (3) U.S. voter turnout is especially low,
but, measured as percent of voting-age population, it is also relatively low in most other countries. (4) Turnout in midterm,
regional, local, and supranational elections-less salient but by no means unimportant elections-tends to be especially poor. (5)
Turnout appears to be declining everywhere. The problem of inequality can be solved by institutional mechanisms that maximize
turnout. One option is the combination of voter-friendly registration rules, proportional representation, infrequent elections,
weekend voting, and holding less salient elections concurrently with the most important national elections. The other option,
which can maximize turnout by itself, is compulsory voting. Its advantages far outweigh the normative and practical objections
to it.
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, and Ethan R. Zorick. 1997. "Capabilities, Perception, and
Escalation." American Political Science Review 91(March):15-27.
The evolution of crises depends upon interpreting intentions under uncertainty. We model crises as a game of two-sided
incomplete information. Players are uncertain about their own payoffs from war because of differences between observable and
actual capabilities. We derive four hypotheses, testing them against crises in Europe between 1815 and 1970. We show a
nonmonotonic relationship between ex ante observable capabilities and the likelihood of violence in a crisis, as well as the ex
ante likelihood of a negotiated settlement. We answer five questions: (1) How do differences in observable capabilities between
rivals influence the likelihood of a crisis and the escalation to violence? (2) How do intangible capabilities alter the effects of
observable capabilities on the likelihood of conflict and violence? (3) What do national leaders learn from the responses of their
adversaries in crises? (4) Under what conditions can deterrence succeed? (5) Under what conditions are the strong likely to
give in to the weak or vice versa in a crisis?
TABLE 1. K and the Probability a Demand is Made
TABLE 2. K and the Probability a Demand is Accepted
TABLE 3. K and Its Nonmonotonic Effect on the Probability of Violence
TABLE 4. Testing a Linear Relationship Between K and the Probability of Violence
TABLE 5. K and the Probability of Negotiated Settlement Before a Demand is Made
TABLE 6. K and its Nonmonotonic Effect on the Probability of Reciprocal Violence
TABLE 7. K and its Nonmonotonic Effect on the Probability of Singer-Small War
TABLE 8. Relative Strength and the Likelihood of Giving in to Violence
FIGURE 1. Game Form
FIGURE 2. Probability of Violence in Equilibria 2, 3, and 4
FIGURE 3. Estimated Probability of Violence as a Function of K
FIGURE 4. Estimated Probabilities of Events as a Function of K
Jeffrey A. Segal. 1997. "Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts." American
Political Science Review 91(March):28-44.
The hallmark of the new positive theories of the judiciary is that Supreme Court justices will frequently defer to the preferences
of Congress when making decisions, particularly in statutory cases in which it is purportedly easy for Congress to reverse the
Court. Alternatively, judicial attitudinalists argue that the institutional structures facing the Court allow the justices to vote their
sincere policy preferences. This paper compares sincere and sophisticated models of voting behavior by Supreme Court
justices. Using a variety of tests on the votes of Supreme Court justices in statutory cases decided between 1947 and 1992, I
find some evidence of sophisticated behavior, but most tests suggest otherwise. Moreover, direct comparisons between the
two models unambiguously favor the attitudinal model. I conclude that the justices overwhelmingly engage in rationally sincere
behavior.
TABLE A-1. Poisson Regression Results: Annual Observations of Total Armed Disputes Initiated in the System (Results from
Full-Period Estimates, 1816-1976, N + 160) able 1. Proportion of Liberal Supreme Court Justices in Civil Rights Cases,
1975-86
TABLE 2. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Committee-Gatekeeping Model
TABLE 3. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Multiple-Veto Model
TABLE 4. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Party-Caucus Model
TABLE 5. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Committee-Gatekeeping Model with Segal-Cover Scores
TABLE 6. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Multiple-Veto Model with Segal-Cover Scores
TABLE 7. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Party-Caucus Model with Segal-Cover Scores
TABLE 8. LSDV Estimates of Pooled Models
TABLE 9. LSDV Estimates of Pooled Models with Median Interaction
FIGURE 1. Justices and Cases in Ideological Space
FIGURE 2. Mark's Model
FIGURE 3. The Court as a Strategic Actor
FIGURE 4. The Set of Pareto Optimals [15, 45] in Congress, 1982
David O. Sears and Nicholas A. Valentino. 1997. "Politics Matters: Political Events as Catalysts for Preadult
Socialization." American Political Science Review 91(March):45-65.
We propose that (1) the preadult socialization of longstanding, stable predispositions is catalyzed by exogenous political events;
(2) such events socialize attitudes selectively, only in the specific domains they make salient; and so (3) longstanding
predispositions tend to be socialized episodically rather than incrementally. This theory is applied to the socialization of
partisanship during a presidential campaign, examining gains in information, affective expression, and attitude crystallization.
Adolescents (aged 10-17) and their parents were interviewed in a three-wave panel study, at the beginning of a presidential
campaign, at the end, and a year later. The campaign induced substantial preadult socialization gains regarding attitude objects
central to the campaign (candidates and parties), particularly in the stability of preadults' partisanship. There were few gains in
attitude domains peripheral to the campaign or during the postcampaign period. These findings suggest that periodic political
events catalyze preadult socialization, generating predispositions that persist into later life stages.
TABLE 1. F values for Partisanship Domains
TABLE 2. F Values for Domains Other than Partisanship
TABLE 3. Means for Individual Scores for Partisanship Domains
FIGURE 1. Partisan Domains: Affect
FIGURE 2. Partisan Domains: Information
FIGURE 3. Partisan Domains: Attitude Crystallization
FIGURE 4. Less Salient Domains: Attitude Crystallization
FIGURE 5. Peripheral Domains: Attitude Crystallization
Christopher J. Anderson and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A
Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems." American Political Science Review
91(March):66-81.
Do political institutions affect citizen satisfaction with democracy? If so, how? Using cross-sectional survey data for eleven
European democracies together with data on the type of democracy in which individuals live, we demonstrate that the nature of
representative democratic institutions (measured by Arend Lijphart's consensus-majority index of democracies) mediates the
relationship between a person's status as part of the political minority or majority and his or her satisfaction with the way the
system works. Specifically, we find that (1) the losers of democratic competition show lower levels of satisfaction than do those
in the majority and (2) losers in systems that are more consensual display higher levels of satisfaction with the way democracy
works than do losers in systems with majoritarian characteristics. Conversely, winners tend to be more satisfied with
democracy the more a country's political institutions approximate pure majoritarian government.
TABLE 1. Effects of Individual-Level Variables on Satisfaction with Democracy in Eleven Countries
TABLE 2. Effects of Individual-Level Variables on Satisfaction with Democracy: Pooled Model Estimates
TABLE 3. Models of Citizen Satisfaction with Democracy among Losers: Pooled Model Estimates
TABLE 4. Models of Citizen Satisfaction with Democracy among Winners: Pooled Model Estimates
FIGURE 1. Hypothesized Satisfaction with Democracy in Different Systems
FIGURE 2. Satisfaction with Democracy, by Country
FIGURE 3. Satisfaction with Democracy among Winners and Losers, by Country
FIGURE 4. Differences in Satisfaction of Winners and Losers, by Type of System
Mark Schneider, Paul Teske, Melissa Marschall, Michael Mintrom, and Christine Roch. 1997. "Institutional
Arrangements and the Creation of Social Capital: The Effects of Public School Choice." American Political
Science Review 91(March):82-93.
While the possible decline in the level of social capital in the United States has received considerable attention by scholars such
as Putnam and Fukuyama, less attention has been paid to the local activities of citizens that help define a nation's stock of social
capital. Scholars have paid even less attention to how institutional arrangements affect levels of social capital. We argue that
giving parents greater choice over the public schools their children attend creates incentives for parents as "citizen/consumers"
to engage in activities that build social capital. Our empirical analysis employs a quasi-experimental approach comparing
parental behavior in two pairs of demographically similar school districts that vary on the degree of parental choice over the
schools their children attend. Our data show that, controlling for many factors, parents who choose when given the opportunity
are higher on all the indicators of social capital analyzed. Fukuyama has argued that it is easier for governments to decrease
social capital than to increase it. We argue, however, that the design of government institutions can create incentives for
individuals to engage in activities that increase social capital.
TABLE 1. District 4 and District 1 Population and Sample Demographics
TABLE 2. The Effects of Choice on the Formation of Social Capital in Two New York Districts
TABLE 3. Montclair and Morristown Population and Sample Demographics
TABLE 4. The Effects of Choice on the Formation of Social Capital in Two New Jersey Districts
Edward D. Mansfield and Rachel Bronson. 1997. "Alliances, Preferential Trading Arrangements, and International
Trade." American Political Science Review 91(March):94-107.
We analyze the effects of alliances and preferential trading arrangements on bilateral trade flows. Both factors are likely to
promote trade among members, but we argue that the interaction between them is central to explaining patterns of commerce.
The combination of an alliance, which creates political incentives for participants to engage in trade, and a commercial
institution, which liberalizes trade among members, is expected to provide a considerable impetus to commerce among parties
to both. The results of our quantitative analyses support these arguments. Both alliances and preferential trading arrangements
strongly affected trade from 1960 to 1990, and allies that included a major power conducted considerably more trade than
their nonmajor-power counterparts. Moreover, the interaction between alliances and preferential trading arrangements is
fundamental to explaining patterns of bilateral commerce: Parties to a common preferential trading arrangement and a common
alliance engage in markedly greater trade than do members of either type of institution but not both.
TABLE 1. Regression of Exports on GDP, Population, Distance, Alliances, Preferential Trading Arrangements, Major-Power
Status, Economies, and War, 1960-1990
TABLE 2. Effects of Alliances, Preferential Trading Arrangements, and Major-Power Status on the Predicted Value of
Exports, Based on Estimates in Table 1
TABLE A-1. Poisson Regression Results: Annual Observations of Total Armed Disputes Initiated in the System (Results from
Full-Period Estimates, 1816-1976, N + 160) E3. Regression of Change in Exports on Changes in GDP, Population, Alliances,
Preferential Trading Arrangements, GATT, Command Economies, and War, 1960-90
Andrew Stark. 1997. "Beyond Quid Pro Quo: What's Wrong with Private Gain from Public Office? " American
Political Science Review 91(March):108-20.
The longstanding debate over whether officials should be permitted to profit personally from public office has moved to the
center of public discourse in the United States. As the House Ethics Manual put it recently, it is of concern simply when an
officeholder "cash[es] in on official position," regardless of whether his or her official performance was in any way impaired as a
result. Although the question of private gain from public office is richly implicative of a number of fundamental issues in political
theory--in particular the ongoing controversy over where to draw the borders between private and public as well as the nature
of official fiduciary responsibility--it has yet to undergo political-theoretic analysis. In what follows, I examine the conceptual
and normative issues emergent in the debate over private gain from public office.
David Dyzenhaus. 1997. "Legal Theory in the Collapse of Weimar: Contemporary Lessons?" American Political
Science Review 91(March):121-34.
The Weimar Republic is frequently invoked in political theory as an example when the issue is the appropriate response of
liberal democracies to internal, fundamental challenges. I explore that example through the lens of a 1932 court case that tested
the legality of the federal government's "coup" against Prussia. In my analysis of the court's judgment and of the arguments of
three political and public law theorists, Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen, and Hermann Heller, I argue for Heller's democratic vision
of the rule of law. In my conclusion, I compare problems in Kelsen's position with problems in the recently articulated position
of John Rawls in order to suggest what lessons Weimar may have for contemporary political theory.
Mark Fey. 1997. "Stability and Coordination in Duverger's Law: A Formal Model of Preelection Polls and
Strategic Voting." American Political Science Review 91(March):135-47.
This paper investigates the dynamics of the "wasted vote" phenomenon and Duverger's Law. I construct a theoretical model in
order to consider how preelection polls serve to inform the electorate about the relative chances of the candidates and how that
information acts over time to decrease the support of the trailing candidate. The results shed light on how public opinion polls
can aggregate information in the electorate and coordinate voters on the viable candidates in the election. Specifically, I show
that in a Bayesian game model of strategic voting there exist non-Duvergerian equilibria in which all three candidates receive
votes (in the limit). These equilibria require extreme coordination, however, and any variation in beliefs leads voters away from
them to one of the Duvergerian equilibria. Thus, non-Duvergerian equilibria are unstable, while two-party equilibria are not. In
addition, I describe how preelection polls provide information to voters about the viability of candidates and can thus be used
by voters to coordinate on a Duvergerian outcome.
TABLE 1. Voter Types in the Electorate
FIGURE 1. The Best Response Function h subscript n (v) as the Size of the Electorate Grows
FIGURE 2. Sequence of Equilibria Converging to v
FIGURE 3. The Adjustment Path of Opinion Polls
FORUM
Jeffrey M. Stonecash and Anna M. Agathangelou. 1997. "Trends in the Partisan Composition of State
Legislatures: A Response to Fiorina." American Political Science Review 91(March):148-55.
The percentage of state legislative seats won by Democrats in nonsouthern states has increased steadily since World War II.
Fiorina (1994) argues that this is because of the professionalization of state legislatures: legislatures now meet longer and pay
higher salaries; legislative positions which require more time are less attractive to Republicans, who can make more money
elsewhere; higher salaries attract Democrats, who make less in the private sector. That analysis has several serious flaws. First,
nonsouthern states have gradually become more Democratic at all levels as part of a long-term regional political realignment.
The rise in Democrats in legislatures outside the South is due more to this realignment than to legislative professionalization.
Second, trends in southern states contradict his hypothesis. Professionalization has increased, but state legislatures are
becoming more Republican. Finally, Fiorina's analysis is worth careful reconsideration because it suggests that there is little
connection between constituencies and partisan outcomes.
TABLE 1. Percentage of Seats in State Legislatures Held by Democrats, by Region, 1900-10
TABLE 2. Coefficients for Regression of Percentage of Democratic Seats on Salary and Annual Session for Nonsouthern
State Houses, 1946-90
TABLE 3. Coefficients for Regression of Percentage of Democratic Seats on Salary and Annual Session, All State Houses,
1946-90
TABLE 4. Regression Results of Percent Democrat, Lower Houses, on Salary and Presence of Annual Sessions, 1946-90
FIGURE 1. Percentage of Seats Held by Democrats in State House, by Region 1946-90
FIGURE 2. Percentage of Seats Held by Democrats in State Senates, by Region 1946-90
FIGURE 3. Percentage of Seats Held by Democrats in the U.S. House, by Region 1946-90
Morris P. Fiorina. 1997. "Professionalism, Realignment, and Representation." American Political Science Review
91(March):156-62.
The critique of my 1994 article by Stonecash and Agathangelou reflects a series of misconceptions and
misunderstandings--about measures, arguments, and findings. In this rejoinder I attempt to correct these. In addition I clarify my
methods and findings. First, I show that a formal statistical test indicates that limiting the analysis to the northern states is
justified. Less formally, the professionalism hypothesis cannot work the same in the South as in the North unless levels of
Democratic legislative strength can rise above 100%. Second, although clearly inferior to a pooled analysis, I show that a
disaggregated (state-by-state) analysis is far more supportive of the professionalization hypothesis than the flawed results
Stonecash and Agathangelou report. Third, despite the repeated assertions of Stonecash and Agathangelou, I demonstrate that
there is no evidence that a long-term partisan realignment to the Democrats is occurring, and that, contrary to their
methodological recommendations, the variables... |
