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We looked at an occupant kinetic analysis of a multicollision sequence, both the 36 car and the wall. Helmet kinetic analysis, physical findings in the vehicle and on the restraint. We looked not just at the helmet kinetic analysis, we looked at the helmet and did a CT scan on it to see if it had been impacted higher up. It was not.

We've analyzed the belt separation kinematics and how that allows a greater displacement. We've looked at the occupant injury patterns. I've shown you some of that. Physical findings on the helmet, both from the CT scans and looking at it.

The data in the scientific literature is consistent with impact causation to produce the ring fracture. And a biomechanical and kinetic analysis of the impact opportunities.

There have been other theories discussed. A number of people have talked about simple head whip. People have talked about mandibular fracture.

The previous analysis by Dr. Myers was one which basically talked about a combination of the two; didn't talk specifically about head whip alone; said that that could do that. But indicated neck tension in conjunction with a head impact, and based upon his data, he looked at that head impact as if occurring to the mandibular. So he saw that as a combination of the two.

It's been reported in various ways around the country.

With neck tension alone, I looked to see if there was something that would tend to give us conclusions with neck tension alone. I looked for the kind of torso contact that would produce the violent head whip that could produce that. I did not see dramatic injuries to the torso. We saw the rib fractures which we discussed, but not internal injuries to the torso.

I looked to see if there was evidence of stretching in the back of the neck from a head whip. That was looked at in the pathology findings, and that was not found. The back of the neck did not show damage to the ligaments or to the bones.

And simple head whip does not explain a death caused by blunt force impacts to the head.

So I don't think we're looking at something. I think it's possible that you can get and you can certainly get basilar skull fractures that way. I think it's relatively unlikely that that is the explanation in this case.

You would not expect to see evidence of -- if you were looking at mandibular impact or impact to the chin, you would look for some findings on the chin. The findings that we see on the abrasion that's described to the right side of the chin from the data I have, would appear more consistent with the chin strap of the helmet as the helmet is attempting to rotate off the head. Particularly with contact to the head.

You can certainly get a basilar skull fracture with mandibular contact. But I would expect a kinetic trajectory consistent with that. If I am forward with the left side of my head leading, I would not expect to hit the right side with my mandibular. In particular, if the left side of my head is leading and I'm to the -- already to the right of the steering wheel and moving to the right, I would not expect to hit the right side of the mandibular, nor would I expect to see evidence of contusion to another part of the head.

Because of the findings we have developed and the analysis of the kinematics, the earlier finding basically said neck tension with some head impact, which based upon that data was from the mandibular. I'm saying there's some neck tension involved but the head impact is more likely to be here. And it's in neither case likely to be pure head whip or head stretch. Our conclusions are these:

It's consistent with the analysis of things that were problems developed in something that normally works pretty well. There's a tendency to want to have a single finding that you can say, "Ahh, that did it, and that's what it is and that's what's at fault." That makes it a lot easier to report, I suppose.

But typically, when something that normally works pretty well, if just one thing goes wrong, it tends to still work pretty well. When multiple things come together and go wrong together, that's when you have problems.

And that's what has happened here. There were multiple events, each of which provided factors which contributed or potentially contributed to the injury. What we see is one of the factors was a very severe collision at a critical angle to the wall.

We see a significant car-to-car collision that occurred very shortly, twice the duration of an eye blink, before that occurred, that pre-positioned the occupant and in that pre-positioning impact and in the wall impact and in the rebound, all of those provide a basis for further displacement of the helmet with respect to the head.

The seat belt separated. It separated under load and it allowed additional forward motion.

On the basis of our analysis, I cannot give you a relative contribution; that it was 30 percent and 40 percent that. But what I cannot say is that there was no potential contribution when you have a head impact in a setting in which a belt separates and allows greater displacement.

Finally, we believe that as a result of those combination of factors that we've listed, that he sustained a fatal ring fracture to the base of his skull as a result of occipital contact likely in the presence of some neck tension, either as he responds to the wall impact after having been pre-positioned to the right, or on the rebound.

Now, that leaves us with multiple factors to look at. And that's the kind of thing that I think Mike Helton has defined for you as far as where we go going forward - that there are things that we can do that would be worth doing to be helpful in that regard.

For one thing, it would be nice not to see seat belts separate. And he's talked about a study that is going to take place that I will have some participation in.

We also would like to see better control of occupant displacement, and NASCAR's recommendations already respond to that.

In the case of recommending of head and neck restraints, but also in the case of recommending the attachment of shoulder harnesses in a fashion that allows more predictable motion of the occupant. There's already developments in nets to the right side that would limit some of that displacement that we talked about.

So those things are being addressed, but we need to be able to be cautious in the way we approach that, as Mike said at the outset, history is replete with attempts to radically alter and immediately alter complex systems that work well by making a big change to redesign it on the basis of the last problem.

We need to make sure that we do not allow radical changes to be taken without considering the unintended consequences that can occur. And that's basically where this thing points us to, is some improvements that can take account of the kinds of unusual and unfortunate combinations of circumstances that we seek bringing about the death of Dale Earnhardt.

Thanks very much. Jim, I guess it's for you.

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