HOLT v. HUTTO - THE SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES THE DARK & EVIL WORLD - Law - http://maxpages.com/arklaw/Holt_v_Hutto_Part

The proceedings of the Committee in a given case are reflected in a document entitled "Disciplinary Report." The Court has seen quite a number of those reports which are made on mimeographed forms. The forms identify the accused inmate, identify the offense and the employee filing the charge. There is a space entitled "Offense in Detail." That space is filled out by the charging employee and signed by him. Next comes a much narrower space entitled[*207] "Statement of Inmate to Committee." It is not clear whether the inmate is permitted to fill this space out himself; more probably, the substance of his statement, if any, is written down by a committee member; the inmate may or may not sign the statement. It appears that an inmate is required to plead either "Guilty" or "Not Guilty" to the charge. The report notes the [**33] inmate's attitude as being either cooperative, uncooperative, or hostile. The members of the Committee are then identified. The decision of the Committee and the sentence imposed are shown on the report, and the document is signed by the Chairman and by the Superintendent.

As the Court of Appeals for this Circuit has recently pointed out, the law as to what procedural due process requires with respect to a prison inmate charged with a violation of prison rules is in a state of flux. Remmers v. Brewer, 8 Cir., 1973, 475 F.2d 52, 54; Dodson v. Haugh, 8 Cir., 1973, 473 F.2d 689. It is clear that such an inmate is not entitled to a full fledged judicial trial or to all of the guarantees and protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment to a person charged in court with a criminal offense. On the other hand, he is entitled to be advised of the charge against him, and to be heard, and to have his case considered seriously, dispassionately, and objectively, although he naturally cannot expect an "impartial" fact finding body in the sense that a criminal defendant is entitled to an "impartial" jury.

The Department's procedures themselves are probably not ideal, and the Court is troubled [**34] by the fact that the Committees seem to be rather heavily weighted in favor of what may be termed the "prosecution." It should be observed, however, that substantial numbers of inmates are acquitted or receive mild punishments, and that probably the vast majority of inmates accused of disciplinary violations are guilty, just as the majority of persons accused of crime in the outside world are guilty.

The Court thinks that the procedures in question would pass constitutional muster if they were properly administered, and if the Committees were willing to spend some time on individual cases and to make considered, rather than perfunctory, determinations of guilt or innocence, would make clear to the accused what the charges against him are, and what his rights are, and what the consequences of conviction may be, and would adopt an attitude that would encourage an accused inmate to state his side of the case, if he has one.

Unfortunately, the procedures are not so administered. On the contrary, in a given case the Committee tends to act summarily and in a very short space of time, and it may display an attitude of hostility toward the inmate calculated to intimidate him and suppress [**35] his version of the incident involved.

The Court is under the impression that disciplinary hearings frequently are held at night, and if the Court is correct in that impression, the night sessions may be part of the trouble with the administration of the procedures. Some or perhaps all of the members of the disciplinary panel probably have been working all day, and they want to go home. That is understandable, but it does not contribute to the proper administration of prison justice.

The Court is going to issue three directives in this area: (1) The rules provide that the Committees are to perform their functions "as quickly as possible." The Court is going to make that requirement more specific by requiring that in cases other than highly exceptional an accused inmate must be given a hearing within 72 hours after the occurrence of the disciplinary episode. In exceptional cases limited extensions of time may be granted by the respective Superintendents. (2) Insofar as possible hearings are to be conducted between the hours of 6 A.M. and 6 P.M. It occurs to the Court that this will not only improve administration of the procedures but may also suggest to respondents that the Committees [**36] be restructured [*208] so as to include more noncustodial personnel who may be available during ordinary business hours but not at night. (3) All hearings must be reported in such manner that if the occasion arises a reviewing authority, including a court, may determine exactly how much time was taken at the hearing and essentially what was said and done by the individuals involved. This means, of course, that the tapes or transcripts of the hearings must be preserved for at least a reasonable time after the hearings take place.

With regard to the reporting of disciplinary proceedings the Court is advised that as of the present time disciplinary proceedings are being taped, and that tape recordings are also being made of certain types of interviews of prison officials with inmates. Assuming of course that the recordings are complete and accurate, the practice should be of value in dealing with inmate complaints about disciplinary proceedings and certain other types of inmate complaints.

As mentioned, one of the punishments that may be imposed on an inmate is confinement in isolation. At Tucker that confinement is in individual cells that were used for years for the confinement [**37] of persons convicted of capital offenses and condemned to die. At Cummins the confinement is in cells in the maximum security unit. The Court finds that the cells are not overcrowded, that they are properly lighted and ventilated, and that confinement in them does not constitute any violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. As in years past, convicts confined in isolation have a restricted diet consisting of a food substance known as "grue," which is nourishing but tasteless; however, a convict confined in isolation receives a regular meal every third day. In earlier stages of the litigation the Court concluded that "grue" is not unconstitutional, and it adheres to that view.

Before leaving this phase of the case, the Court desires to comment briefly on conditions of confinement in the maximum security unit in general. An inmate is placed in the unit either as a disciplinary measure, or for his own protection, or for purposes of "administrative segregation." While it appears to the Court that some of the conditions of confinement in the unit are perhaps somewhat more rigorous than may be absolutely necessary, the Court does not find that [**38] those conditions are such as to render confinement in the unit unconstitutional.

A word needs to be said about the "quiet" cells in the maximum security unit. Those cells which are soundproof are located in the middle of the building; each one of them has a double door; when the outer door is closed, the inmate is in complete darkness. The cells are essentially devoid of furniture and fixtures; bedding is not supplied. As the Court recalls, there was a somewhat excessive use of the quiet cells soon after the maximum security unit was activated, but the Court finds that as of now the cells are not used excessively or in an inhumane manner. Use of the cells is limited to violent inmates who cannot be controlled in any other manner, and usually an inmate's stay in a quiet cell is quite brief. Further, it is not uncommon for an inmate to be placed in a quiet cell without being placed in darkness; the outer door of the cell is simply left open.

One problem in the field of disciplinary procedures that calls for comment arises out of the fact that at times it is necessary for purposes of discipline and good order to transfer young inmates from Tucker to Cummins, and at times emergency [**39] situations arise in which it appears necessary to the authorities at Tucker to move a young inmate or young inmates immediately. The Court has no trouble with such transfers, including emergency transfers, because the Court knows that young convicts can and frequently do present serious disciplinary and other problems and at times are more violent and irresponsible than [*209] older convicts. What does trouble the Court is what happens to a young inmate after he goes to Cummins.

Evidence taken in November of last year described an illustrative case. In early 1972 authorities at Tucker had cause to believe that a number of youths confined there were planning to incite a riot or promote a sit down strike. This information was obtained during the late afternoon or night of a particular day, and the riot or sit down strike was supposed to take place the next morning. The young men were summarily moved in the night time from the one institution to the other, and at the time of the November hearing one of them was still there.

There are educational and vocational facilities at Tucker that are not available at Cummins, and many of the inmates of Cummins are hardened criminals [**40] with whom a youth of comparatively tender years should not be confined any longer than reasonably necessary. As has been pointed out, there is as yet no minimum security unit at Cummins, and young convicts sent down from Tucker have to be confined either in the maximum security unit or in the barracks among the general prison population. Confinement in neither place is desirable for a young convict, and it is hard to tell which is worse.

The Court finds that prior to the November hearing there was no set policy with respect to getting young transferees back to the milder regime at Tucker, and that nobody seemed to care particularly whether or when a young transferee was retransferred. That situation gave the Court a serious problem, particularly in view of the contention of counsel that a young Arkansas convict has a constitutional right not to be unreasonably deprived of opportunities for improvement that exist at Tucker.

Following the November hearings Commissioner Hutto issued a Policy Memorandum which addressed itself to the problem. The Memorandum provides in substance that in other than emergency situations inmates are not to be transferred from Tucker to Cummins without [**41] a hearing before the Tucker Disciplinary Committee or the Tucker Classification Committee, or both, and that after prisoners reach Cummins their cases are to be evaluated every 90 days by the Cummins Classification Committee with the end in view of getting them back to Tucker as soon as possible. If a Tucker inmate is transferred in an emergency situation, he is entitled to a hearing before the Cummins Classification Committee within 72 hours of his arrival at Cummins. All transfer and retransfer decisions may be appealed to the Commissioner by the affected inmates.

Subject to one qualification the Court finds that the Commissioner's Memorandum appears to solve the problem satisfactorily. The Court does not think the Cummins Classification Committee should wait 90 days before reviewing the case of a transferee because it may not take the transferee 90 days to realize the error of his ways and to become ready to behave himself if sent back to Tucker. The Court thinks that the first evaluation should be not later than two weeks after the transferee arrives at Cummins, and that a second evaluation should not be later than 30 days after the first one. If by that time the transferee [**42] is not ready to go back to Tucker, the Court thinks that later evaluations at 90 day intervals are adequate.

The Commissioner will be directed to amend his Memorandum accordingly. Of course, it goes without saying that authorities at Cummins will take proper precautions for the safety of young transferees while they are confined at Cummins.

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